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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2351 
___________ 
 
LEO GIBNEY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS FITZGIBBON; MERCK & CO., INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-00007) 
District Judge:  Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2013 
 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 30, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Leo Gibney appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  We will affirm.   
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I. 
The facts being well-known to the parties, we set forth only those pertinent to this 
appeal.  Gibney filed a complaint for defamation against defendants Merck & Co., Inc. 
(“Merck”) and Thomas FitzGibbon (“FitzGibbon”), an in-house lawyer for Merck with the title 
“Legal Director.”  The action was removed from the Court of Common Pleas for Montgomery 
County to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the basis 
of diversity of citizenship.1   
According to the complaint, Gibney was an employee of Evolution, Inc. (“Evolution”) 
and worked on a research project pursuant to a contract between Evolution and Merck.  He 
accused Evolution of improperly billing Merck.  Evolution terminated Gibney’s employment, 
purportedly because he objected to Evolution’s fraudulent scheme.  Gibney then contacted two 
Merck officers via letter, in which he detailed Evolution’s alleged improper billing, 
complained that Evolution had unjustly fired him, and requested that Merck undertake an 
audit.  FitzGibbon’s response to Gibney copied the two Merck officers to whom Gibney had 
written, as well as three other individuals.2  It stated in relevant part: 
While I note your “request” for an audit, we see no need for any such audit.  As 
far as Merck is concerned, the alleged overbilling has been investigated, the 
allegations have been determined to be unfounded and the matter is now closed 
and warrants no further action by Merck.   
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction because Gibney is a citizen of Pennsylvania, Merck and 
FitzGibbon are citizens of New Jersey, and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of 
$75,000.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
2 FitzGibbon also copied Gibney’s previous attorney and two other Merck employees on the 
letter.  Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 6, at 3 n.4 and Exhibit C.   
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Gibney claimed that FitzGibbon falsely stated that the allegations were “unfounded” 
and that he suffered substantial and permanent harm to his reputation as a result, including a 
defamation claim brought by Evolution against him.3 
 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The District 
Court granted the motion, holding that the “statement in issue here…was not capable of a 
defamatory meaning as a matter of law.”  Thereafter, the District Court denied Gibney’s 
motion to alter or amend the judgment or grant leave to amend the complaint.  This appeal 
followed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise “plenary review over the 
District Court order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”  Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 
F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  We review denial of a motion to alter or amend a 
judgment or leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  See  Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 
864 (3d Cir. 1984); Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 
(3d Cir. 2010).  Because Gibney has proceeded pro se throughout, his filings will be liberally 
construed, but he is still required to allege sufficient facts in his complaint to support a valid 
claim.  See Mala v. Crown Bar Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013).  To do so, 
Gibney must plead enough facts, accepted as true, to plausibly suggest entitlement to relief.  
                                              
3 This defamation claim is a counterclaim that Evolution filed in response to the wrongful 
termination claim Gibney filed against Evolution, which is pending in the Montgomery County 
Court of Common Pleas.  See Gibney v. Evolution Marketing Research, LLC, No. 2012-
10933, Montgomery County Ct. Com. Pl. 
 
4 
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675, 
679 (2009)).   
 “Although replete with First Amendment implications, a defamation suit fundamentally 
is a state cause of action.”  Jenkins v. KYW, 829 F.2d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations 
omitted).  In resolving claims based on Pennsylvania law, “we must do what we predict the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would do.”  Wassall v. DeCaro, 91 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8343(a), a plaintiff is required to prove seven elements to 
make out a claim of defamation, including inter alia, proof of “[t]he defamatory character of 
the communication.”  Whether a communication is capable of defamatory meaning is a 
“threshold issue” to be determined by the court.  Kurowski v. Burroughs, 994 A.2d 611, 617 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2010); see also Blackwell v. Eskin, 916 A.2d 1123, 1125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) 
(“Whether the contested statements are capable of defamatory meaning is a question of law for 
the court.”).  The plaintiff bears the burden of making this showing and “[i]f the court 
determines that the challenged publication is not capable of defamatory meaning, there is no 
basis for the matter to proceed to trial.”  Kurowski, 994 A.2d at 617 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).    
In considering whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning, the court 
considers “whether the statement tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in 
the estimation of the community or to deter third parties from associating or dealing with him.”  
Tucker v. Phila. Daily News, 848 A.2d 113, 124 (Pa. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The statement must be examined in context to determine its likely effect on the reader, id., and 
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the Court should evaluate the effect it is likely to produce “in the minds of the average persons 
among whom it is intended to circulate.” Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).   Furthermore, the statement must do more than 
merely annoy or embarrass the purported victim.  Phila. Daily News, 848 A.2d at 124 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).    
The statement in question here- that “[a]s far as Merck is concerned, the alleged 
overbilling has been investigated, [and] the allegations have been determined to be 
unfounded”- says nothing about Gibney himself or his character, yet he claims that it “conveys 
that [he] made false or unsubstantiated accusations about [Evolution].”  However, innuendo 
“cannot be used to introduce new matter, or to enlarge the natural meaning of the words, and 
thereby give to the language a construction which it will not bear.” Sarkees v. Warner-W. 
Corp., 349 Pa. 365, 368 (1944) (citation omitted).  As the District Court explained, FitzGibbon 
was simply answering Gibney’s letter “providing Gibney with the result of the investigation 
that Gibney’s letter had initiated.”  Gibney asks us to read meaning into the statement which 
clearly is not there.  While Gibney was dissatisfied with FitzGibbon’s statement that his 
allegations were unfounded, even if that statement were untrue, it would not “lower him in the 
estimation of the community or…deter third parties from associating or dealing with him.”  
Tucker, 848 A.2d at 124.  We therefore agree with the District Court that FitzGibbon’s 
statement was not capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law.4    
                                              
4 Gibney attempts to provide defamatory meaning to FitzGibbon’s statement by arguing that it 
was the basis for Evolution’s defamation counterclaim against him, and that the District Court 
erred because it never addressed this fact.  Gibney’s argument is unavailing.  The fact that 
Evolution has a counterclaim against Gibney for statements he made about Evolution has no 
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III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the District Court that dismissal was proper.  
Accordingly, we will affirm.5 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
bearing on the statement made by FitzGibbon here which, we have established, is incapable of 
defamatory meaning. 
5We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gibney’s motion to 
alter or amend the judgment or grant leave to amend the complaint, because Gibney did not 
meet the requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and amending the 
complaint would be futile.  See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (citation omitted); See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
